Method and system for technician authentication of a vehicle

ABSTRACT

The service technician accesses the prospective vehicle and obtains from a certification authority a certification that an authentic vehicle is associated with a cryptographic key. The service technician utilizes the cryptographic key in cryptographic communication with the prospective vehicle via a secure device having limited accessibility but being accessible by the service technician. The service technician determines whether the prospective vehicle is the authentic vehicle based on whether the cryptographic key is successfully utilized in the cryptographic communication with the prospective vehicle.

RELATED APPLICATIONS

The present invention is related to the following applications which areassigned to the same assignee as the present invention:

METHOD AND SYSTEM FOR VEHICLE AUTHENTICATION OF A COMPONENT, filed Jun.28, 2002, having Ser. No. 10/184,530;

METHOD AND SYSTEM FOR COMPONENT OBTAINMENT OF VEHICLE AUTHENTICATION,filed Jun. 28, 2002, having Ser. No. 10/184,571;

METHOD AND SYSTEM FOR VEHICLE AUTHENTICATION OF A COMPONENT USING KEYSEPARATION, filed Jun. 28, 2002, having Ser. No. 10/184,570;

METHOD AND SYSTEM FOR VEHICLE AUTHENTICATION OF A COMPONENT CLASS, filedJun. 28, 2002, having Ser. No. 10/186,351;

METHOD AND SYSTEM FOR VEHICLE AUTHENTICATION OF A SUBASSEMBLY, filedJun. 28, 2002, having Ser. No. 10/186,370;

METHOD AND SYSTEM FOR VEHICLE AUTHENTICATION OF A SUBASSEMBLY, filedJun. 28, 2002, having Ser. No. 10/186,373;

METHOD AND SYSTEM FOR SUBASSEMBLY AUTHENTICATION OF A COMPONENT, filedJun. 28, 2002, having Ser. No. 10/184,787;

METHOD AND SYSTEM FOR COMPONENT AUTHENTICATION OF A VEHICLE, filed Jun.28, 2002, having Ser. No. 10/184,760;

METHOD AND SYSTEM FOR VEHICLE COMPONENT AUTHENTICATION OF ANOTHERCOMPONENT, filed Jun. 28, 2002, having Ser. No. 10/184,786;

METHOD AND SYSTEM FOR VEHICLE AUTHENTICATION OF A REMOTE ACESS DEVICE,filed Jun. 28, 2002, having Ser. No. 10/184,745;

METHOD AND SYSTEM FOR VEHICLE AUTHENTICATION OF ANOTHER VEHICLE, filedJun. 28, 2002, having Ser. No. 10/184,746;

METHOD AND SYSTEM FOR VEHICLE AUTHENTICATION OF A SERVICE TECHNICIAN,filed Jun. 28, 2002, having Ser. No. 10/184,747;

METHOD AND SYSTEM FOR VEHICLE AUTHORIZATION OF A SERVICE TECHNICIAN,filed Jun. 28, 2002, having Ser. No. 10/185,107;

METHOD AND SYSTEM FOR AUTHORIZING RECONFIGURATION OF A VEHICLE, filedJun. 28, 2002, having Ser. No. 10/185,126;

METHOD AND SYSTEM FOR MAINTAINING A CONFIGURATION HISTORY OF A VEHICLE,filed Jun. 28, 2002, having Ser. No. 10/185,130;

FIELD OF THE INVENTION

The present invention relates to vehicles and, more particularly, to theconfiguration of vehicles.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

Modern vehicles contain a number of configuration elements includingcomponents such as engine controllers, transmission controllers, brakecontrollers, HVAC components, steering controllers, components forlights, door locks, and wipers, and components relating to audio, videoand telecommunications. Appropriate configuration of these configurationelements within a vehicle is very important. The configuration elementsof the vehicle must be compatible with the vehicle and with each otherto ensure safe and effective operation of that vehicle.

During production, the vehicle is within the direct control of themanufacturer, who can thus ensure an appropriate initial configurationby predesignating the configuration elements for use with each vehicle.However, after the vehicle is manufactured and sold, the manufacturercannot know what specific configuration elements might be introducedinto the configuration, how and by whom, as the vehicle manufacturer canno longer directly control the configuration. Similarly, a componentmanufacturer of a component not predesignated for use with a vehicle orother configuration element cannot know in advance what specificvehicles or specific configuration elements the component will beconfigured with, and how and by whom it will be so configured.

Accordingly, there is a need for an effective means of controllingvehicle configuration and configuration elements beyond manufacture andthroughout the life of the vehicle.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

The invention is described in terms of several preferred embodiments setout below and with reference to the following drawings in which likereference numerals are used to refer to like elements throughout.

FIG. 1 is a block diagram illustrating a vehicle environment inaccordance with an embodiment of the present invention;

FIG. 2 is a block diagram illustrating a vehicle system in accordancewith an embodiment of the present invention;

FIG. 3 is a block diagram illustrating a secure vehicle database inaccordance with an embodiment of the present invention;

FIG. 4 is a block diagram illustrating a vehicle component in accordancewith an embodiment of the present invention;

FIG. 5 is a block diagram illustrating a vehicle cryptographic unit inaccordance with an embodiment of the present invention;

FIG. 6 is a block diagram illustrating a component cryptographic unit inaccordance with an embodiment of the present invention;

FIG. 7 is a flowchart showing novel aspects of configuration control;

FIG. 8 is a block diagram illustrating an environment in which acomponent is authenticated in accordance with an embodiment of thepresent invention;

FIG. 9 is a flowchart of the process of vehicle authentication of acomponent in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention;

FIG. 10 is a block diagram illustrating a component certificate inaccordance with an embodiment of the present invention;

FIG. 11 is a flowchart of the process of vehicle authentication of acomponent class in accordance with an embodiment of the presentinvention;

FIG. 12 is a block diagram illustrating a component class certificate inaccordance with an embodiment of the present invention;

FIG. 13 is a flowchart of the process of component authentication of avehicle in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention;

FIG. 14 is a block diagram illustrating a vehicle certificate inaccordance with an embodiment of the present invention;

FIG. 15 is a flowchart of the process of component authentication of acomponent in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention;

FIGS. 16-17 are block diagrams illustrating an environment in which aremote access device is authenticated for secure communication inaccordance with an embodiment of the present invention;

FIG. 18 is a flowchart of the process of vehicle secure communicationwith a remote access device in accordance with an embodiment of thepresent invention;

FIG. 19 is a block diagram illustrating a remote access devicecertificate in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention;

FIG. 20 is a flowchart of the process of secure communication amongvehicles in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention;

FIG. 21 is a block diagram illustrating an environment in which aservice technician is authenticated in accordance with an embodiment ofthe present invention;

FIG. 22 is a flowchart of the process of vehicle authentication of aservice technician in accordance with an embodiment of the presentinvention;

FIG. 23 is a block diagram illustrating a secure physical token for aservice technician in accordance with an embodiment of the presentinvention; and

FIG. 24 is a block diagram illustrating a service technician certificatein accordance with an embodiment of the present invention.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS

The present invention provides an effective means of authenticating avehicle or component by a service technician performing a serviceoperation on the vehicle. Throughout the life of a vehicle, it maybecome necessary or desirable for a service technician to perform aservice operation on a vehicle, such as to install a new component or tomodify, upgrade, repair or replace an existing one. However, from theperspective of the service technician, a vehicle or component involvedin a service operation might not be authentic. Thus, the presentinvention provides a method and system for technician authentication ofa vehicle, which can be described generally as follows.

The service technician accesses the prospective vehicle and obtains froma certification authority a certification that an authentic vehicle isassociated with a cryptographic key. The service technician utilizes thecryptographic key in cryptographic communication with the prospectivevehicle via a secure device having limited accessibility but beingaccessible by the service technician. The service technician determineswhether the prospective vehicle is the authentic vehicle based onwhether the cryptographic key is successfully utilized in thecryptographic communication with the prospective vehicle.

By providing a means for the service technician performing a serviceoperation with respect to a vehicle or component to authenticate thatvehicle or component, the invention provides the service technician withthe ability to ensure the service operation does not involve a vehicleor component that is stolen or counterfeit or inappropriate for acorresponding reconfiguration of the vehicle. The vehicle manufacturerand/or component manufacturer are also provided additional protection byauthentication by the service technician.

Vehicle Environment

A vehicle environment will now be described which includes animplementation of an embodiment of the invention. Referring to thedrawings, FIG. 1 illustrates a vehicle 100 having a vehicle network 102which connects configuration elements of the vehicle. The configurationelements include a vehicle system 104 and a number of componentsincluding internal components 106 and external components thatpotentially extend beyond the body of the vehicle, such as a remoteaccess device 110, a secure physical token 120 and an external vehicle130.

The vehicle 100 is, for example, a commercially available automobilesuch as a car or truck, but may include any type of commerciallyavailable vehicle. The vehicle network 102 can be, for example, avehicle active network as is described in U.S. patent application Ser.Nos. 09/945,581, 09/944,892, 09/943,908, 09/943,870, 09/943,882,09/944,653, 09/944,893, 09/944,887, 09/943,921, 09/944,891, 09/943,914,and U.S. Pat. No. 6,747,365. The vehicle active network described in theabove patents provides the capability of communicatively connectingcomponents in potentially multiple locations via potentially multiplecommunication paths through a number of active network elements.Utilizing this implementation in the vehicle environment describedherein provides a flexible configuration into which components not fullycontemplated during design and manufacture of a vehicle can beinstalled, replaced, upgraded, and so forth in a modular fashion.

Returning to FIG. 1, the vehicle system 104 includes the capability ofrepresenting the vehicle in interaction with other configurationelements in the vehicle configuration, and may perform a number ofvehicle-related functions including secure storage of vehicle relateddata. The vehicle system 104 may be a centralized vehicle system or maybe distributed throughout the vehicle network 102. The internalcomponents 106 may include any of a number of hardware, firmware orsoftware elements within the vehicle including, but not limited to,engine controllers, transmission controllers, brake controllers, HVACcomponents, steering controllers, components for lights, door locks, andwipers, and components relating to audio, video, telematics andcommunications.

FIG. 2 illustrates the vehicle system 104 in more detail. The vehiclesystem 104 includes a vehicle computing unit 202. The vehicle computingunit 202 may perform a variety of computing functions and may include anumber of elements such as a processor, input/output unit, memory and soforth, which can be either commercially available or specializedelements, depending on the circumstances and needs at hand. The vehiclesystem 104 also includes a vehicle cryptographic unit 204. The vehiclecryptographic unit 204 performs cryptographic functions of the vehiclesystem 104, such as encryption, decryption, key establishment, signatureand verification. Additionally, the vehicle system 104 includes aconfiguration database 206 which stores data related to theconfiguration of components in the vehicle 100. The vehicle system 104further includes a secure vehicle database 208 which stores datarelating to the vehicle such as control data, authentication data andauthorization data. The secure vehicle database 208 provides varyinglevels of data security, potentially from minimal to maximal, where andas warranted by the type of data.

FIG. 3 shows the secure vehicle database 208 in greater detail. Thesecure vehicle database 208 stores a vehicle identifier 302 whichuniquely represents the vehicle 100. The vehicle identifier 302 is, forexample, a uniquely identifiable set of alphanumeric charactersidentifying the vehicle 100. The secure vehicle database 208 stores thevehicle identification number 302 with read only access such that thevehicle identification number cannot be altered. The secure vehicledatabase 208 additionally stores a vehicle certificate 306 whichcertifies the vehicle 100. The secure vehicle database 208 also has asecure vehicle memory 308 which stores data related to the vehicle 100,such as certificates certifying configuration elements related to thevehicle 100. The secure vehicle memory 308 may store data with varyinglevels of security, potentially from minimal to maximal, where and aswarranted by the type of data.

FIG. 4 illustrates a component 400 of the vehicle network 102. Thecomponent 400 may be an internal component 106, or may be included in aninternal component 106, or may be an external component or portionthereof, such as the remote access device 110, secure physical token 120or external vehicle 130. The component 400 includes a componentcomputing unit 402 which, similar to the vehicle computing unit 202, mayperform a variety of computing functions and may include a numbercommercially available or specialized elements such as a processor,input/output unit, memory, and so forth. The component 400 also includesa component cryptographic unit 404. The component cryptographic unit 404performs cryptographic functions such as encryption, decryption, keyestablishment, signature and verification.

The component 400 additionally includes a component serial number 406.The component serial number 406 is, for example, a number oralphanumeric string which uniquely identifies the component 400 or acomponent class to which the component 400 belongs. The component 400stores the component serial number 406 with read-only access such thatthe component serial number cannot be altered. The component 400 mayalso have a component memory 410 which stores additional data related tothe component 400, the vehicle 100, and so forth.

FIG. 5 shows the vehicle cryptographic unit 204 in more detail. Thevehicle cryptographic unit 204 includes a vehicle cryptographicprocessor 502 which applies a vehicle private key 504 to execute avehicle cryptographic algorithm 506. The vehicle private key 504 isutilized by the vehicle cryptographic algorithm 506 in cryptographiccommunication, such as to authenticate the vehicle 100 to a component400, and potentially for other purposes such an ongoing communicationwith components. The vehicle private key 504 is accessible only by thevehicle cryptographic processor 502 and is, for example, a privatecryptographic key for use in public key cryptography.

The vehicle cryptographic unit 204 provides highly secure data storagein order to protect the vehicle private key 504. For example, thevehicle cryptographic unit 204 may be designed to encapsulate thevehicle cryptographic processor 502, vehicle cryptographic algorithm 506and vehicle private key 504 together in a sealed unit that cannot beaccessed by leads and cannot be opened without destroying or permanentlyinactivating the vehicle cryptographic unit 204. The vehiclecryptographic unit 204 may further be designed to prevent or obfuscatethe emission of identifiable bit patterns from the vehicle cryptographicunit 204 which could otherwise be utilized to identify the vehicleprivate key 504. One of ordinary skill in the art will recognize variousapproaches for providing secure storage depending on the requirements athand. An example secure memory and processing system is described, forexample, in patent application Ser. No. 09/671,949.

FIG. 6 shows the component cryptographic unit 404 in more detail. Thecomponent cryptographic unit 404 includes a component cryptographicprocessor 602 which applies a component private key 604 to execute acomponent cryptographic algorithm 606. The component private key 604 isutilized by the component cryptographic algorithm 606 in cryptographiccommunication, such as to authenticate the component 400 within which itis provided to other configuration elements such as the vehicle system104 or other components, and potentially for other purposes such anongoing communication with other configuration elements. The componentprivate key 604 is accessible only by the component cryptographicprocessor 602 and is, for example, a private encryption key for use inpublic key cryptography.

Like the vehicle cryptographic unit 204, the component cryptographicunit 404 provides highly secure data storage in order to protect thecomponent private key 604. The component cryptographic unit 404 may bedesigned to encapsulate the component cryptographic processor 602,component cryptographic algorithm 606 and component private key 604together in a sealed unit that cannot be accessed by leads and cannot beopened without destroying or permanently inactivating the componentcryptographic unit 404. The component cryptographic unit 404 may furtherbe designed to prevent or obfuscate the emission of identifiable bitpatterns from the component cryptographic unit 404 which could otherwisebe utilized to identify the component private key 604.

Configuration Control

As introduced above, the present invention provides a means ofcontrolling vehicle configuration beyond manufacture and throughout thelife of the vehicle. The specification describes the invention in thecontext of several main novel aspects of configuration control whichrelate to the invention and related inventions referenced above. Thesenovel aspects include authentication, authorization and configurationmanagement. Authentication as described herein involves the process ofensuring a vehicle, component or individual performing an operation withrespect thereto is the entity it is identified and expected to be.Authorization involves determining whether a configuration element isallowed in the configuration or a function related to a configurationelement or the vehicle configuration is allowed to be performed.Configuration management as provided herein involves maintaining ahistory of configuration functions for the configuration elements in thevehicle, and/or a history of service operations performed on the vehicleand the service technicians who have performed them.

FIG. 7 illustrates an example process which includes these novel aspectsof configuration control. In step 710, a vehicle, component orindividual related thereto first authenticates a configuration element.For example, the vehicle 100 may authenticate a prospective component400 for installation in the vehicle 100. In step 720, uponauthenticating the configuration element, a function related to theconfiguration element is authorized. For example, the vehicle 100 mayauthorize installation of the prospective component 400 by referring tothe configuration database 206 and determining the component 400 isauthorized to be installed in the vehicle 100 based on the currentconfiguration of the vehicle as indicated in the configuration database206.

In step 730, the configuration of vehicle 100 is continually maintainedby tracking what configuration elements are in a current configurationof the vehicle 100 at a given time, reconfiguration functions that alterthe configuration and when they occur, and by tracking what serviceoperations have been performed on the vehicle 100 and by what servicetechnicians. For example, the vehicle 100 records installation of theprospective component 400 in the configuration database 206. AlthoughFIG. 7 is shown as a flowchart having these aspects in the orderdescribed above, it is noted that any number and combination of theseelements may occur in potentially different orders in the various novelaspects of configuration control as provided herein

Authentication

As introduced above, one novel aspect of configuration control asprovided herein is authentication of configuration elements of thevehicle configuration. As will be described, a configuration element,vehicle or service technician can be authenticated by autonomousoperation by a vehicle or configuration element in the configuration. Asa result, a vehicle or component manufacturer can ensure theconfiguration element, vehicle or service technician is the entity it isidentified to be, even after manufacture and sale of the vehicle orcomponent.

A number of novel types of authentication provided herein involveauthentication performed by the vehicle. One such type of authenticationis vehicle authentication of a component, which can be generallydescribed as follows. A vehicle obtains a prospective component for usein the vehicle. The prospective component may be obtained directly froma component manufacturer or component supplier, or indirectly throughone or more other entities. The vehicle also obtains from acertification authority a certification that an authentic component isassociated with a cryptographic key. An authentic component is acomponent whose identifying information and other attributes are true,as is vouched for by a certification authority that can be trusted as areliable source.

The certification authority could be a component supplier ormanufacturer, or another certification authority such as a conventionalpublic certification authority or specialized entity specific to theindustry or a segment thereof. The certification authority could alsoitself be certified by a second certification authority, which could inturn be certified by a third certification authority, and so on.

The certification may be obtained directly or indirectly from thecertification authority. It may be provided as data stored on thecomponent or external to the component. The certification certifies thatthe cryptographic key is bound to information identifying the authenticcomponent, and may be implemented, for example, with a digitalcertificate obtained from a certificate authority. The certification mayalso include a digital signature of the certification authority. Thecertification may certify that a component having an identifiedattribute such as a component serial number, an identified componentsupplier or other attribute is associated with the cryptographic key.The cryptographic key may be a public cryptographic key corresponding toa private key of the authentic component, which could be accessible onlyby the authentic component.

The vehicle utilizes the cryptographic key obtained from thecertification authority in cryptographic communication with theprospective component, and determines whether the prospective componentis the authentic component based on whether the cryptographic key issuccessfully utilized in the cryptographic communication. For example,the cryptographic key corresponds to a secret key of the authenticcomponent, such that successful decryption using the cryptographic keyensures that data could only be from the authentic component. Upondetermining the prospective component is the authentic component, thevehicle may allow the prospective component to become operative withinthe vehicle.

As with other novel types of authentication that will be describedbelow, the cryptographic communication utilized in authentication can beany type of symmetric or asymmetric cryptography. Asymmetric keycryptography is advantageous for authentication, as it can be performedonce to reliably establish authenticity for long-term use. It is alsoespecially beneficial for the prospective entity to use a secret key, asexplained above. Public key cryptography is particularly effective forthe novel types of authentication described herein since theauthenticating entity can utilize a public key which is easy to obtainwithout compromising security, while the prospective entity can use acorresponding private key securely stored by the prospective entity.Alternatively, symmetric key cryptography may be applied forauthentication or other purposes, as it provides a different setadvantages such as requiring less of acomputational burden.

The above process may be performed by the vehicle by, for example, avehicle system having a cryptographic unit which utilizes thecryptographic key in cryptographic communication and a computing unitwhich determines whether the prospective component is the authenticcomponent. The vehicle may additionally determine that the certificationauthority is authorized to certify the authentic component, such as byaccessing a dynamic list that was prestored and remains rewritable bythe vehicle manufacturer or applying a prestored root key to verify thedigital signature of the certification authority.

Also, the general process of a vehicle authenticating a component isdescribed above in terms of the process performed by the vehicle. Fromthe perspective of the component, the process can also be viewed as acomponent obtaining vehicle authentication. The prospective componentstores a first cryptographic key and utilizes the first cryptographickey in cryptographic communication with the vehicle, which determineswhether the component is authentic in the manner described above. Theprospective component may then obtain authorization from the vehicle tobecome operative upon successfully utilizing the first key incryptographic communication with the vehicle.

Returning to the perspective of the vehicle, as a more specific example,FIGS. 8 and 9 illustrate a potential embodiment of vehicleauthentication of a component as described above. FIG. 8 illustrates aphysical implementation and FIG. 9 illustrates a corresponding processof the potential embodiment. In step 910, a component supplier 802provides the component 400 to an original equipment manufacturer (OEM)804 a prospective component which is implemented, for example, as thecomponent 400 as described herein. In step 920, the component supplier802 provides a component certificate 806 to the original equipmentmanufacturer 804 which certifies the component 400. The componentcertificate 806 may be stored as data on the component 400 in, forexample, the component memory 410. Alternatively, the componentcertificate 806 may be external to the component 400.

The component certificate 806 is a digital certificate which iscertified by the component supplier as a certificate authority. FIG. 10shows a potential embodiment of the component certificate 806. Thecomponent certificate 806 includes a component serial number 1010 thatmatches the component serial number 406 for the component 400 itcertifies. The component certificate 806 further includes a componentpublic key 1020 which corresponds to the component private key 604 inthe component 400 it certifies. The component certificate 806 alsoincludes, potentially in addition to other component certificate fields,a component supplier digital signature 1040. The component supplierdigital signature 1040 is created by the component supplier 802 by, forexample, hashing the other component certificate fields 1010, 1020,etc., and signing the hash using a private cryptographic key of thecomponent supplier 802 to generate the component supplier digitalsignature 1040.

In step 930, the original equipment manufacturer 804 physically installsor otherwise connects the component 400 to the vehicle 100 via thevehicle network 102, and provides the component certificate 806 to thevehicle 100 via download, flash memory or other means, which stores itin the secure vehicle memory 308 of the secure vehicle database 208. Instep 940, the vehicle system 104 uses the component supplier digitalsignature 1040 to verify the component certificate 806 by, for example,using a root key of the component supplier that was previously stored inthe secure vehicle memory 308 of the secure vehicle database 208.Alternatively, the vehicle system 104 could use a digital signature of acertificate authority certifying the component supplier 802 to verify adigital certificate from that certificate authority by, for example,using a root key of the certificate authority that was previously storedin the secure vehicle database 208.

In step 950, the vehicle system 104 issues a cryptographic challenge tothe component 400, transferring challenge data such as a randomlygenerated number to the component 400 via the vehicle network 102. Instep 960, the component 400 encrypts the challenge data using thecomponent private key 604 and transfers the encrypted challenge databack to the vehicle system 104 via the vehicle network 102. In step 970,the vehicle system 104 confirms the authenticity of the component bydecrypting the challenge data using the component public key 1020 fromthe component certificate 806 and determining that the challenge datadecrypted by the component 400 is identical to the original challengedata before encryption by the vehicle system 104. Upon authenticatingthe component, the vehicle system 104 may authorize the component 400 tobecome operative within the vehicle, or to pass to a next required eventor authorization.

The above process can be applied to authenticate a component any timeduring the life of a vehicle. This includes installation of thecomponent during manufacture of the vehicle or subassembly of thevehicle, or after manufacture, such as by a dealer or OEM 804, or anafter-market supplier. Component authentication can also be performedduring testing, replacement, modification, upgrade or repair of thecomponent, and periodically during operation of the vehicle.Additionally, component authentication can be performed during recyclingof a component when a vehicle is decommissioned, removing thecertificate and providing it to a new vehicle into which the componentis installed.

Vehicle authentication of a component as described above provides manybenefits. Even after manufacture and sale of the vehicle with respect toa component not predesignated for use with the vehicle, the vehiclemanufacturer is able to accomplish configuration control throughautonomous operation of the vehicle. Thus, the vehicle manufacturer isable to maintain brand control, allowing only components with a requiredbrand. The vehicle manufacturer is also able to confirm that thecomponent is not counterfeit. Thus, even after manufacture and sale ofthe vehicle, the vehicle manufacturer can ensure that an improper orinferior component is not installed which could damage the vehicle orreduce its capabilities and/or quality of performance. Further,protection against theft is provided, since the component is notoperative without being authenticated using a second key such as apublic key corresponding to the component private key 604.

Additional protection from theft of the component can be accomplished byanother novel type of authentication provided herein, wherein vehicleauthentication of a component is provided utilizing key separation. Thisis similar to vehicle authentication of a component as described above,but with the additional feature that the vehicle obtains thecertification separately from the prospective component. That is, thecomponent 400 and the component certificate 806 are provided bydifferent physical means, a different physical path and/or at adifferent time. For example, the component 400 may be delivered to theoriginal equipment manufacturer 804 by truck whereas the componentcertificate 806 is transferred to the original equipment manufacturer804 via the internet. Separating the component 400 from the componentcertificate 806 protects against theft of the component 400, because thecomponent 400 is not operable without being authenticated by a processutilizing the component public key in the certificate. Thus, in anembodiment of the invention utilizing key separation, step 920 wouldfurther include the component supplier 802 providing the component 400and component certificate 806 separately to the original equipmentmanufacturer 804 and the original equipment manufacturer 804 matchingthe component 400 to the component certificate 806 by identifying thecertificate with a component serial number that matches the componentserial number 406 in the component 400.

Still another novel type of authentication provided herein is vehicleauthentication of a component class. This type of authentication differsfrom component authentication as described above in that a componentclass of the prospective component, rather than the individualcomponent, is authenticated. The prospective component is a member of acomponent class defined by similar attributes, such as being a samemodel or type, or having a same brand or supplier. All components insuch a class utilize a same cryptographic key rather than havingdiffering individual cryptographic keys.

In a general description of vehicle authentication of a component class,a vehicle obtains a prospective component for use in the vehicle. Theprospective component has a first cryptographic key which is unique tothe component class of the prospective component. The prospectivecomponent may be obtained directly from a component manufacture orcomponent supplier, or indirectly through one or more other entities.

The vehicle also obtains from a certification authority a certificationthat an authentic component of the component class is associated with asecond cryptographic key. An authentic component is a component whoseidentifying information and other attributes are true, including anidentification of a component class of which the component is a member,as is vouched for by a certification authority that can be trusted as areliable source. The certification authority could be a componentsupplier or manufacturer, or another certification authority such as aconventional public certification authority or specialized entityspecific to the industry or a segment thereof. The certificationauthority could also itself be certified by a second certificationauthority, which could in turn be certified by a third certificationauthority, and so on.

The certification may be obtained directly or indirectly from thecertification authority. The certification certifies that the secondcryptographic key is bound to information identifying an authenticcomponent of the component class, and may be implemented, for example,with a digital certificate obtained from a certificate authority. Thecertification may also include a digital signature of the certificationauthority. The certification may certify that a component having anidentified attribute such as a component serial number, an identifiedcomponent supplier or other attribute is associated with the secondcryptographic key. The second cryptographic key may be a publiccryptographic key and the first cryptographic key may be a privatecryptographic key of the authentic component and potentially accessibleonly by the authentic component, corresponding to the publiccryptographic key.

The vehicle utilizes the second cryptographic key obtained from thecertification authority in cryptographic communication with theprospective component, and determines whether the prospective componentis an authentic component of the component class based on whether thesecond cryptographic key is successfully utilized in the cryptographiccommunication. For example, the cryptographic key corresponds to asecret key of the authentic component class, such that successfuldecryption using the cryptographic key ensures that data could only befrom a component in the authentic component class. Upon determining theprospective component is an authentic component of the component class,the vehicle may allow the prospective component to become operativewithin the vehicle.

The above process may be performed by the vehicle by, for example, avehicle system having a cryptographic unit which utilizes thecryptographic key in cryptographic communication and a computing unitwhich determines whether the prospective component is an authenticcomponent of the component class. The vehicle may additionally determinethat the certification authority is authorized to certify the authenticcomponent, such as by accessing a dynamic list that was prestored andremains rewritable by the vehicle manufacturer or applying a prestoredroot key to verify the digital signature of the certification authority.

As a more specific example, FIG. 11 illustrates a process for performinga potential embodiment of vehicle authentication of a component class.In step 1110, the component supplier 802 provides a component 400 to theoriginal equipment manufacturer 804 as described before. In step 1120,the component supplier 802 provides a component class certificate 1200to the original equipment manufacturer 804 which certifies the class ofthe component 400. The component class certificate 1200 is a digitalcertificate which is certified by the component supplier.

FIG. 12 shows a potential embodiment of the component class certificate1200. The component class certificate 1200 includes a component class ID1210 which matches the component serial number 406 or a correspondingclass ID stored in the component 400. Preferably, the component classcertificate 1200 also has a copyright field 1230 including a copyrightnotice, thus providing a degree of protection in that copying thecertificate would potentially infringe the copyright. The componentclass certificate 1200 further includes a component class public key1220 which corresponds to the component private key 604 in the componentcryptographic unit 404 of the component 400. The component classcertificate 1200 also includes, potentially in addition to othercomponent class certificate fields, a component supplier digitalsignature. The component supplier digital signature 1240 is generated,for example, in a fashion similar to the component supplier digitalsignature 1040 as described above.

In step 1130, the original equipment manufacturer 804 physicallyinstalls or otherwise connects the component 400 to the vehicle 100 viathe vehicle network 102, and provides the component class certificate1200 to the vehicle 100, which stores it in the secure vehicle memory308 of the secure vehicle database 208. In step 1140, the vehicle system104 uses the component supplier digital signature 1240 to verify thecomponent class certificate 1200 by, for example, using a root key ofthe component supplier that was previously stored in the secure vehiclememory 308 of the secure vehicle database 208. Alternatively, thevehicle system 104 could use a digital signature of a certificateauthority certifying the component supplier 802 to verify a digitalcertificate from that certificate authority by, for example, using aroot key of the certificate authority that was previously stored in thesecure vehicle database 208.

In step 1150, the vehicle system 104 issues a cryptographic challenge tothe component 400, transferring a randomly generated number to thecomponent 400 via the vehicle network 102. In step 1160, the component400 encrypts the challenge data using the component private key 604 andtransfers the encrypted challenge data back to the vehicle system 104via the vehicle network 102. In step 1170, the vehicle system 104 usesthe component class public key from the component class certificate 1200to decrypt the challenge data, confirming the authenticity of thecomponent class by determining that the decrypted challenge data isidentical to the original challenge data before encryption by thecomponent 400. Upon authenticating the component class, the vehiclesystem 104 may authorize the component 400 to become operative withinthe vehicle, or to pass to a next required event or authorization.

Vehicle authentication of a component class offers the advantage ofreduced cost and improved efficiency in providing security for acomponent in that a different key pair does not have to be generated forevery component. Even so, the vehicle is still able to authenticate thatthe component belongs to a particular class and thus ensure that it isappropriate for the use for which it is being installed. Further,assuming the private key is not previously compromised, the vehicle isalso able to confirm that the component is from the component supplierand not counterfeit, thus maintaining brand control.

Yet another novel type of authentication provided herein is multiplescope authentication of vehicle components. In this type ofauthentication, a vehicle may authenticate one component individually,but authenticate a component class of a different component. This isbeneficial because, for example, the expense, criticality andsensitivity of different components may warrant different degrees ofinvestment by manufacturers, OEMs and customers to obtaincorrespondingly different degrees of security. Providing the optionwithin a same vehicle to authenticate either a component or a componentclass provides greater value to the vehicle by allowing vehicle andcomponent manufacturers to choose to invest in a level of security thatis warranted by the value of a given component and by its particularneed for authenticity.

Generally speaking, multiple scope authentication of vehicle componentsthus combines the concepts of component authentication and componentclass authentication as described above, wherein a first prospectivecomponent has a cryptographic key unique to the first prospectivecomponent, and a second prospective component has a cryptographic keythat is unique to a component class of the second prospective component.The first prospective component is authenticated as described above forvehicle authentication of a component, and the second prospectivecomponent is authenticated as described above for vehicle authenticationof a component class.

More specifically, a potential embodiment of multiple scopeauthentication of vehicle components may be realized by a same vehicleperforming the process of FIG. 9 with respect to a first component,wherein a cryptographic key, such as a component private key 604 for thefirst component, is unique to the first component, and by performing theprocess of FIG. 11 with respect to a second component, wherein adifferent cryptographic key, such as of different component private key604 for the second component, is only unique to an entire componentclass of the second component.

Other novel types of authentication provided herein involveauthentication performed by a subassembly of a vehicle or a componentfor use with the vehicle. One such type of authentication is componentauthentication of a vehicle, which can be generally described asfollows. A component for use in a prospective vehicle accesses thevehicle, such as by physical installation or connection to the vehicle.The component obtains from a certification authority a certificationthat an authentic vehicle is associated with a cryptographic key. Anauthentic vehicle is a vehicle whose identifying information and otherattributes are true, as is vouched for by a certification authority thatcan be trusted as a reliable source. The certification authority couldbe a vehicle supplier or manufacturer, or another certificationauthority such as a conventional public certification authority orspecialized entity specific to the industry or a segment thereof. Thecertification authority could also itself be certified by a secondcertification authority, which could in turn be certified by a thirdcertification authority, and so on.

The certification may be obtained directly or indirectly from thecertification authority. The certification certifies that thecryptographic key is bound to information identifying the authenticvehicle, and may be implemented, for example, with a digital certificateobtained from a certificate authority. The certification may alsoinclude a digital signature of the certification authority. Thecertification may certify that a vehicle having an identified attributesuch as a vehicle identifier, an identified vehicle manufacturer orother attribute is associated with the cryptographic key.

The cryptographic key may be a public cryptographic key of the authenticvehicle and the authentic vehicle may have a corresponding privatecryptographic key potentially accessible only by the authentic vehicle.The component utilizes the cryptographic key obtained from thecertification authority in cryptographic communication with theprospective vehicle, and determines whether the prospective vehicle isthe authentic vehicle based on whether the cryptographic key issuccessfully utilized in the cryptographic communication. For example,the cryptographic key corresponds to a secret key of the authenticvehicle, such that successful decryption using the cryptographic keyensures that data could only be from the authentic vehicle. Upondetermining the prospective vehicle is the authentic vehicle, thecomponent may allow the prospective vehicle to operate the component.

The above process may be performed by the component by, for example, acryptographic unit which utilizes the cryptographic key in cryptographiccommunication and a computing unit which determines whether theprospective vehicle is the authentic vehicle.

As a more specific example, FIG. 13 illustrates a process for performinga potential embodiment of component authentication of a vehicle. In step1310, the component 400 connects to the vehicle 100 such as byinstallation for potential use in the vehicle 100. The vehicle 100 has avehicle private key 504 which is, for example, stored in the securevehicle database 208 shown in FIG. 3. In step 1320, the component 400obtains a vehicle certificate 306 which certifies the vehicle 100 andis, for example, a digital certificate also stored in the secure vehicledatabase 208. FIG. 14 shows a potential embodiment of the vehiclecertificate 306. The vehicle certificate 306 includes a vehicleidentifier 1410 which matches the vehicle identifier 302 for the vehicle100 it certifies. The vehicle certificate 306 further includes a vehiclepublic key 1420 which corresponds to the vehicle private key 504 of thevehicle 100 it certifies.

The vehicle certificate 306 also includes, potentially in addition toother vehicle certificate fields, a vehicle manufacturer digitalsignature 1440 of a vehicle manufacture, or a digital signature of someother certificate authority certifying the vehicle. The vehiclemanufacturer digital signature 1440 is generated, for example, in afashion similar to the component supplier digital signature 1040 asdescribed above. In step 1340, the component 400 verifies the vehiclecertificate 306 using the certificate authority digital signature fromthe vehicle certificate 306 as a verification by, for example, using aroot key of the certificate authority that was previously stored in thecomponent 400 or is otherwise obtained.

In step 1350, the component 400 issues a cryptographic challenge to thevehicle system 104, transferring a randomly generated number to thevehicle system 104 via the vehicle network 102. In step 1360, thevehicle system 104 encrypts the challenge data using the vehicle privatekey 504 and transfers the encrypted challenge data back to the component400 via the vehicle network 102. In step 1370, the component 400 usesthe vehicle public key from the vehicle certificate 306 to decrypt thechallenge data, confirming the authenticity of the vehicle 100 bydetermining that the challenge data decrypted by the component 400 isidentical to the original challenge data before encryption by thecomponent 400. Upon authenticating the vehicle, the component 400 mayauthorize the vehicle 100 to operate the component 400, or to pass to anext required event or authorization. By performing the above process toauthenticate a vehicle, the component confirms the authenticity of thevehicle, providing advantages such as brand control for componentsuppliers and OEMs.

An additional novel type of authentication performed by a component foruse in a vehicle involves vehicle component authentication of anothervehicle component. As a general description of this type ofauthentication, a configured component of a vehicle obtains from acertification authority a certification that an authentic component isassociated with a cryptographic key. An authentic component is acomponent whose identifying information and other attributes are true,as is vouched for by a certification authority that can be trusted as areliable source. The certification authority could be a componentsupplier or manufacturer, or another certification authority such as aconventional public certification authority or specialized entityspecific to the industry or a segment thereof. The certificationauthority could also itself be certified by a second certificationauthority, which could in turn be certified by a third certificationauthority, and so on.

The certification may be obtained directly or indirectly from thecertification authority. The certification certifies that thecryptographic key is bound to information identifying the authenticcomponent, and may be implemented, for example, with a digitalcertificate obtained from a certificate authority. The certification mayalso include a digital signature of the certification authority. Thecertification may certify that a component having an identifiedattribute such as a component serial number, an identified componentmanufacturer or other attribute is associated with the cryptographickey.

The cryptographic key may be a public cryptographic key of the authenticcomponent and the prospective component may have a corresponding privatecryptographic key of the authentic component and potentially accessibleonly by the authentic component.

The configured component utilizes the cryptographic key obtained fromthe certification authority in cryptographic communication with theprospective component, and determines whether the prospective componentis the authentic component based on whether the cryptographic key issuccessfully utilized in the cryptographic communication. For example,the cryptographic key corresponds to a secret key of the authenticcomponent, such that successful decryption using the cryptographic keyensures that data could only be from the authentic component. Upondetermining the prospective component is the authentic component, theconfigured component may allow the prospective vehicle to operate thecomponent.

The above process may be performed by the configured component by, forexample, a cryptographic unit which utilizes the cryptographic key incryptographic communication and a computing unit which determineswhether the prospective vehicle is the authentic vehicle.

As a more specific example, FIG. 15 illustrates a process for performinga potential embodiment of vehicle component authentication of anothervehicle component. In step 1510, a prospective component for use in thevehicle 100 is accessed by a second component already part of theconfiguration of the vehicle 100. Both the prospective and secondcomponent are implemented, for example, as component 400 is described inFIG. 4. The prospective component has a component private key 604 whichis, for example, as shown in FIG. 4. In step 1520, the second componentobtains a component certificate 806 which certifies the prospectivecomponent. A potential embodiment of the component certificate 806 wasshown in FIG. 10. In step 1540, the second component verifies thecomponent certificate 806 of the prospective component using thecomponent supplier digital signature from the component certificate 806as a verification by, for example, using a root key of the componentsupplier.

In step 1550, the second component issues a cryptographic challenge tothe prospective component, transferring challenge data such as arandomly generated number to the prospective component via the vehiclenetwork 102. In step 1560, the prospective component encrypts thechallenge data using the component private key 604 and transfers theencrypted challenge data back to the second component via the vehiclenetwork 102. In step 1570, the second component using the componentpublic key from the component certificate 806 of the prospectivecomponent to decrypt the challenge data, confirming the authenticity ofthe prospective component by determining that the challenge datadecrypted by the second component is identical to the original challengedata before encryption by the second component. Upon authenticating theprospective component, the second component may authorize operation ofthe prospective component with the configured component and/or withinthe vehicle, or to pass to a next required event or authorization.

Other novel types of authentication provided herein involveauthentication of or by a vehicle subassembly. A vehicle subassembly isa group of configuration elements which are combined as a unit within avehicle during or after production of the vehicle or a portion thereof.For example, a group of components 106 may be combined together as asubassembly which can then be treated similarly to a component 106 andcombined with other components 106 or other subassemblies. In thisfashion, there can also be nested layers of subassemblies which includesubordinate subassemblies and potentially other components, and so on.

One novel type of authentication involving a vehicle subassembly isvehicle subassembly authentication of a component within thesubassembly. As a general description of this type of authentication, avehicle subassembly obtains a prospective component for use in thevehicle subassembly. The prospective component may be obtained directlyfrom a component manufacturer or component supplier, or indirectlythrough one or more other entities. The vehicle subassembly also obtainsfrom a certification authority a certification that an authenticcomponent is associated with a cryptographic key. An authentic componentis a component whose identifying information and other attributes aretrue, as is vouched for by a certification authority that can be trustedas a reliable source.

The certification authority could be a component supplier ormanufacturer, or another certification authority such as a conventionalpublic certification authority or specialized entity specific to theindustry or a segment thereof. The certification authority could alsoitself be certified by a second certification authority, which could inturn be certified by a third certification authority, and so on.

The certification may be obtained directly or indirectly from thecertification authority. The certification certifies that thecryptographic key is bound to information identifying the authenticcomponent, and may be implemented, for example, with a digitalcertificate obtained from a certificate authority. The certification mayalso include a digital signature of the certification authority. Thecertification may certify that a component having an identifiedattribute such as a component serial number, an identified componentsupplier or other attribute is associated with the cryptographic key.The cryptographic key may be a public cryptographic key corresponding toa private key of the authentic component, which could be accessible onlyby the authentic component.

The vehicle subassembly utilizes the cryptographic key obtained from thecertification authority in cryptographic communication with theprospective component, and determines whether the prospective componentis the authentic component based on whether the cryptographic key issuccessfully utilized in the cryptographic communication. For example,the cryptographic key corresponds to a secret key of the authenticcomponent, such that successful decryption using the cryptographic keyensures that data could only be from the authentic component. Upondetermining the prospective component is the authentic component, thevehicle subassembly may allow the prospective component to becomeoperative within the vehicle subassembly.

The above process may be performed by the vehicle subassembly by, forexample, a subassembly system having a cryptographic unit which utilizesthe cryptographic key in cryptographic communication and a computingunit which determines whether the prospective component is the authenticcomponent. The vehicle subassembly may additionally determine that thecertification authority is authorized to certify the authenticcomponent, such as by accessing a dynamic list that was prestored andremains rewritable by the vehicle subassembly manufacturer or applying aprestored root key to verify the digital signature of the certificationauthority. Additionally, the vehicle subassembly may itself beauthenticated by a vehicle system of the vehicle, a component of thevehicle, or a configured subassembly of the vehicle.

More specifically, in a potential embodiment of vehicle subassemblyauthentication of a component as described above, a vehicle subassemblycontains a number of components 106 and is implemented as a potentialconfiguration element of the vehicle 100. The process can be implementedby the subassembly system performing the steps that were described inFIG. 9 as being performed by the vehicle system 104. A subassemblysystem performing the above process could be implemented in the form ofa component 400 and potentially with additional functions andcapabilities similar to those of the vehicle system 104. The subassemblysystem could be implemented as a single configuration element ordistributed throughout the vehicle subassembly or vehicle network 102.

Vehicle subassembly authentication of a component may be performed anumber of times to authenticate a number of components, such asauthenticating all components in the vehicle subassembly to ensure thevehicles subassembly is an authentic entity. This provides efficiencyadvantages, as the vehicle subassembly can then itself be authenticatedonce as a singular entity by a vehicle, component or configuredsubassembly.

Another novel type of authentication involving a vehicle subassembly isvehicle authentication of a subassembly within the vehicle. As a generaldescription, a vehicle obtains a prospective subassembly for use in thevehicle. The prospective subassembly may be obtained directly from asubassembly manufacturer or subassembly supplier, or indirectly throughone or more other entities. The vehicle also obtains from acertification authority a certification that an authentic subassembly isassociated with a cryptographic key. An authentic subassembly is asubassembly whose identifying information and other attributes are true,as is vouched for by a certification authority that can be trusted as areliable source.

The certification authority could be a subassembly supplier ormanufacturer, or another certification authority such as a conventionalpublic certification authority or specialized entity specific to theindustry or a segment thereof. The certification authority could alsoitself be certified by a second certification authority, which could inturn be certified by a third certification authority, and so on.

The certification may be obtained directly or indirectly from thecertification authority. The certification certifies that thecryptographic key is bound to information identifying the authenticsubassembly, and may be implemented, for example, with a digitalcertificate obtained from a certificate authority. The certification mayalso include a digital signature of the certification authority. Thecertification may certify that a subassembly having an identifiedattribute such as a subassembly serial number, an identified subassemblysupplier or other attribute is associated with the cryptographic key.The cryptographic key may be a public cryptographic key corresponding toa private key of the authentic subassembly, which could be accessibleonly by the authentic subassembly.

The vehicle utilizes the cryptographic key obtained from thecertification authority in cryptographic communication with theprospective subassembly, and determines whether the prospectivesubassembly is the authentic subassembly based on whether thecryptographic key is successfully utilized in the cryptographiccommunication. For example, the cryptographic key corresponds to asecret key of the authentic subassembly, such that successful decryptionusing the cryptographic key ensures that data could only be from theauthentic subassembly. Upon determining the prospective subassembly isthe authentic subassembly, the vehicle may allow the prospectivesubassembly to become operative within the vehicle.

The above process may be performed by the vehicle by a configurationelement of the vehicle 100 which has a cryptographic unit which utilizesthe cryptographic key in cryptographic communication and a computingunit which determines whether the prospective subassembly is theauthentic subassembly. The configuration element may be, for example,the vehicle system 104, a component 106 or a configured subassembly ofcomponents. The vehicle may additionally determine that thecertification authority is authorized to certify the authenticsubassembly, such as by accessing a dynamic list that was prestored andremains rewritable by the vehicle manufacturer or applying a prestoredroot key to verify the digital signature of the certification authority.

More specifically, in a potential embodiment of vehicle authenticationof a subassembly as described above, the process described above can beimplemented by the vehicle by performing the steps performed in FIG. 9with respect to the subassembly instead of a single component, andapplied to a subassembly system representing the prospective subassemblyinstead of a prospective component. The subassembly system performingthe above process could be implemented in the form of a component 400,storing a private cryptographic key of the prospective subassembly andother such information similar to that stored by a component 400. Thesubassembly system could be implemented as a single configurationelement or distributed throughout the vehicle subassembly or vehiclenetwork 102.

Still other novel types of authentication provided herein involve theauthentication of vehicles or components external to the vehicle forsecure communication therewith. One such type of authentication involvessecure vehicle communication with a remote access device. As a generaldescription of this concept, a vehicle obtains from a certificationauthority a certification that an authentic device is associated with acryptographic key. An authentic device is a device whose identifyinginformation and other attributes are true, as is vouched for by acertification authority that can be trusted as a reliable source.

The certification authority could be a supplier or manufacturer of theauthentic device, or another certification authority such as aconventional public certification authority or specialized entityspecific to the industry or a segment thereof. The certificationauthority could also itself be certified by a second certificationauthority, which could in turn be certified by a third certificationauthority, and so on.

The certification may be obtained directly or indirectly from thecertification authority. The certification certifies that thecryptographic key is bound to information identifying the authenticdevice, and may be implemented, for example, with a digital certificateobtained from a certificate authority. The certification may alsoinclude a digital signature of the certification authority. Thecertification may certify that a component having an identifiedattribute associated with the cryptographic key. The cryptographic keymay be a public cryptographic key of the authentic device correspondingto a private cryptographic key of the authentic device potentiallyaccessible only by the authentic device.

The vehicle utilizes the cryptographic key obtained from thecertification authority in cryptographic communication with the remoteaccess device, and determines whether the remote access device is theauthentic device based on whether the cryptographic key is successfullyutilized in the cryptographic communication. For example, thecryptographic key corresponds to a secret key of the authentic device,such that successful decryption using the cryptographic key ensures thatdata could only be from the authentic device. Upon determining theremote access device is the authentic device, the vehicle communicatesfurther with the remote access device.

The above process may be performed by the vehicle by, for example, avehicle system having a cryptographic unit which utilizes thecryptographic key in cryptographic communication and a computing unitwhich determines whether the prospective component is the authenticcomponent. The vehicle may additionally determine that the certificationauthority is authorized to certify the authentic device, such as byaccessing a dynamic list that was prestored and remains rewritable bythe vehicle manufacturer or applying a prestored root key to verify thedigital signature of the certification authority.

The remote access device may be connected to a secure device whichperforms the cryptographic functions in the cryptographic communicationdescribed above and stores a cryptographic key such as the privatecryptographic key, which may be accessible only by the secure device.Alternatively, the remote access may perform the cryptographic functionsand/or store the private cryptographic key, and may require a passwordor biometric authentication from a user in order to use the remoteaccess device to access the vehicle.

More specifically, a potential embodiment of secure vehiclecommunication with a remote access device is described with reference toFIGS. 16-18. FIGS. 16 and 17 illustrate alternative implementations ofthis potential embodiment. In FIG. 16, a remote access device 110 iscommunicatively coupled to a vehicle 100 via a wireless communicationlink. The remote access device 110 is also connected to a securephysical token 1602 which represents the remote access device 110 insecure communication with the vehicle 100. FIG. 17 illustrates analternative implementation in which the remote access device 110 is notrepresented by a secure physical token 120, but rather requires the userto enter a password or obtains other identifying data such as biometricdata. The secure physical token 1602 in FIG. 16, and a correspondingportion of the remote access device 110 in FIG. 17, can be considered atype of component and, as such, include in some form a computingelement, cryptographic algorithms in addition to other elements such asare discussed below.

FIG. 18 illustrates a process of a potential embodiment of securevehicle communication with a remote access device corresponding to theimplementations described above with reference to FIGS. 16 and 17. Instep 1810, the vehicle system 104 responds to the remote access device110, either in response to a request for access by the remote accessdevice 110 or in response to the remote access device 110 coming withinrange or a predetermined distance of the vehicle 100. In step 1820, thevehicle system 104 obtains an remote access device certificate 1900 froma certificate authority. The remote access device certificate 1900 is,for example, a digital certificate which is certified by the certificateauthority.

FIG. 19 shows a potential embodiment of the remote access devicecertificate 1900. The remote access device certificate 1900 includes aremote access device identification (ID) number 1910 that matches an IDnumber stored in the remote access device 110 or in the secure physicaltoken 1602 representing the remote access device 110. The remote accessdevice certificate 1900 further includes a remote access device publickey 1920 which corresponds to a private key of the remote access device110 stored in the secure physical token 1602. The remote access devicecertificate 1900 also includes, potentially in addition to other remoteaccess device certificate fields, a certificate authority digitalsignature of the certificate authority providing the remote accessdevice certificate 1900. The remote access device certificate 1900 isgenerated, for example, in a fashion similar to the component supplierdigital signature 1040 as described above. In step 1840, the vehiclesystem 104 verifies the remote access device certificate 1900 using thecertificate authority digital signature from the remote access devicecertificate 1900 as a verification by, for example, using a root key ofthe certificate authority that was previously stored in the securevehicle database 208.

In step 1850, the vehicle system 104 issues a cryptographic challenge tothe remote access device certificate 1900, the vehicle 100 transmittingchallenge data such as a randomly generated number to the remote accessdevice 110. In step 960, the remote access device 110 or the securephysical token 1602 representing the remote access device 110 encryptsthe challenge data using the private key of the remote access device 110and transmits the encrypted challenge data back to the vehicle 100. Instep 1870, the vehicle system 104 confirms the authenticity of theremote access device 110 by decrypting the challenge data using thepublic key of the remote access device 110 from the remote access devicecertificate 1900 and determining that the challenge data decrypted bythe vehicle system 104 is identical to the original challenge databefore encryption by the vehicle system 104. Upon authenticating theremote access device 110, the vehicle system 104 may authorize theremote access device 110 to access vehicle data in the vehicle 100.

Another novel type of authentication of elements external to the vehiclerelates to secure vehicle communication with another vehicle, which canbe generally described as follows. A first vehicle obtains from acertification authority a certification that an authentic vehicle isassociated with a cryptographic key. An authentic vehicle is a vehiclewhose identifying information and other attributes are true, as isvouched for by a certification authority that can be trusted as areliable source.

The certification authority could be a supplier or manufacturer of theauthentic vehicle, or another certification authority such as aconventional public certification authority or specialized entityspecific to the industry or a segment thereof. The certificationauthority could also itself be certified by a second certificationauthority, which could in turn be certified by a third certificationauthority, and so on.

The certification may be obtained directly or indirectly from thecertification authority. The certification certifies that thecryptographic key is bound to information identifying the authenticvehicle, and may be implemented, for example, with a digital certificateobtained from a certificate authority. The certification may alsoinclude a digital signature of the certification authority. Thecertification may certify that a vehicle having an identified attributeassociated with the cryptographic key. The cryptographic key may be apublic cryptographic key of the authentic vehicle corresponding to aprivate cryptographic key of the authentic vehicle potentiallyaccessible only by the authentic vehicle.

The first vehicle utilizes the cryptographic key obtained from thecertification authority in cryptographic communication with a secondvehicle, and determines whether the second vehicle is the authenticvehicle based on whether the cryptographic key is successfully utilizedin the cryptographic communication. For example, the cryptographic keycorresponds to a secret key of the authentic vehicle, such thatsuccessful decryption using the cryptographic key ensures that datacould only be from the authentic vehicle. Upon determining the secondvehicle is the authentic vehicle, the vehicle communicates further withthe second vehicle.

The above process may be performed by the first vehicle by, for example,a vehicle system having a cryptographic unit which utilizes thecryptographic key in cryptographic communication and a computing unitwhich determines whether the prospective component is the authenticcomponent. The first vehicle may additionally determine that thecertification authority is authorized to certify the authentic device,such as by accessing a dynamic list that was prestored and remainsrewritable by the vehicle manufacturer or applying a prestored root keyto verify the digital signature of the certification authority.

As a more specific example, FIG. 20 illustrates a process of a potentialembodiment of secure vehicle communication with another vehicle. In step2010, a first vehicle 100 accesses a second vehicle 130. The secondvehicle 130 has a vehicle private key 504 which is, for example, storedin the secure vehicle database 208 shown in FIG. 3. In step 2020, thefirst vehicle 100 obtains a vehicle certificate 306 which certifies thesecond vehicle 130 and is, for example, a digital certificate alsostored in the secure vehicle database 208. It will be remembered thatFIG. 14 shows a potential embodiment of the vehicle certificate 306. Thevehicle certificate 306 includes a vehicle identification number whichmatches the vehicle identifier 302 for the second vehicle 130. Thevehicle certificate 306 further includes a vehicle public key whichcorresponds to the vehicle private key 504 of the second vehicle 130.The vehicle certificate 306 additionally includes a vehicle manufacturerdigital signature which uniquely identifies the vehicle manufacture, ora certificate authority digital signature which uniquely identifiesanother certificate authority certifying the second vehicle 130. In step2040, the first vehicle 100 verifies the vehicle certificate 306 usingthe certificate authority digital signature from the vehicle certificate306 as a verification by, for example, using a root key of thecertificate authority that was previously stored in the secure vehicledatabase 208 of the first vehicle 100.

In step 2050, the first vehicle 100 issues a cryptographic challenge tothe second vehicle 130, transmitting a randomly generated number to thesecond vehicle 130. In step 2060, the vehicle system 104 of the secondvehicle 130 encrypts the challenge data using the vehicle private key504 and transmits the encrypted challenge data back to the first vehicle100. In step 2070, the first vehicle uses the vehicle public key fromthe vehicle certificate 306 of the second vehicle 130 to decrypt thechallenge data, confirming the authenticity of the second vehicle 130 bydetermining that the challenge data decrypted by the first vehicle 100is identical to the original challenge data before encryption by thefirst vehicle 100. Upon authenticating the second vehicle 130, the firstvehicle 100 may authorize the second vehicle 130 to access vehicle datawithin the first vehicle 100.

Still another novel type of authentication provided herein involvesvehicle authentication of a service technician. As a general descriptionof this type of authentication, a vehicle accesses a secure devicehaving limited accessibility but being accessible by a servicetechnician. The service technician can be anyone desiring to perform aservice operation on the vehicle such as installation, upgrade or repairof a configuration element of the vehicle. The secure device stores afirst cryptographic key associated with the service technician. Thevehicle also obtains from a certification authority a certification thatan authentic technician is associated with a second cryptographic keycorresponding to the first cryptographic key. An authentic technician isa technician whose identifying information and other attributes aretrue, as is vouched for by a certification authority that can be trustedas a reliable source.

The certification authority could be a manufacturer or supplier of thevehicle or a component related to the service operation, or anothercertification authority such as a conventional public certificationauthority or specialized entity specific to the industry or a segmentthereof. The certification authority could also be a second servicetechnician and/or could itself be certified by a second certificationauthority, which could in turn be certified by a third certificationauthority, and so on.

The certification may be obtained directly or indirectly from thecertification authority. The certification certifies that the secondcryptographic key is bound to information identifying the authentictechnician, and may be implemented, for example, with a digitalcertificate obtained from a certificate authority. The certification mayalso include a digital signature of the certification authority. Thecertification may certify an attribute as well as the identity of theservice technician. The certification may certify that the servicetechnician is considered reliable and/or a member of an authorizedorganization. And, given that such factors change frequently, thecertification may be time-limited, such as a digital certificate with anexpiration date and time. The second cryptographic key may be a publiccryptographic key corresponding to a private key of the authentictechnician and potentially accessible only by the authentic technician.

The vehicle utilizes the second cryptographic key obtained from thecertification authority in cryptographic communication with the securedevice, and determines whether the service technician is the authentictechnician based on whether the cryptographic key is successfullyutilized in the cryptographic communication. For example, thecryptographic key corresponds to a secret key of the authentictechnician, such that successful decryption using the cryptographic keyensures that data could only be from the authentic technician. Upondetermining the service technician is the authentic technician, thevehicle may allow the prospective component to become operative withinthe vehicle.

The above process may be performed by the vehicle by, for example, avehicle system having a cryptographic unit which utilizes thecryptographic key in cryptographic communication and a computing unitwhich determines whether the service technician is the authentictechnician. The vehicle may additionally determine that thecertification authority is authorized to certify the authentictechnician, such as by accessing a dynamic list that was prestored andremains rewritable by the vehicle manufacturer or applying a prestoredroot key to verify the digital signature of the certification authority.

FIG. 21 illustrates a physical implementation of, and FIG. 22illustrates a corresponding process of, an embodiment of vehicleauthentication of a service technician. In step 2210, a servicetechnician 2102 access the vehicle 100 via a secure physical token 2104.FIG. 23 shows a potential embodiment of the secure physical token 2104.The secure physical token 2104 stores a technician identification number2302 uniquely identifying the service technician 2102 and additionallystores a technician private key 2304 of the service technician 2102. Thesecure physical token 2104 can be considered a type of component and, assuch, includes in some form a computing element, cryptographicalgorithms in addition to other elements such as are discussed below. Instep 2220, the vehicle obtains a service technician certificate 2400from the secure physical token 2104, certified by a certificateauthority.

FIG. 24 shows a potential embodiment of the service techniciancertificate 2400. The service technician certificate 2400 includes atechnician ID number 2410 which matches the technician identificationnumber 2302 stored in the secure physical token 2104 for the servicetechnician 2102 that the service technician certificate 2400 certifies.The service technician certificate 2400 further includes a technicianpublic key 2420 which corresponds to the technician private key 2304 inthe secure physical token 2104. The service technician certificate 2400additionally includes a certificate authority digital signature. Thecertificate authority digital signature 2440 is generated, for example,in a fashion similar to the component supplier digital signature 1040 asdescribed above.

In step 2240, the vehicle system 104 verifies the service techniciancertificate 2400 using the certificate authority digital signature 2440from the service technician certificate 2400 as a verification by, forexample, using a root key of the certificate authority that waspreviously stored in the secure vehicle database 208.

In step 2250, the vehicle system 104 issues a cryptographic challenge tothe secure physical token 2104, transferring challenge data such as arandomly generated number to the secure physical token 2104. In step2260, the secure physical token 2104 encrypts the challenge data usingthe technician private key 2304 and transfers the encrypted challengedata back to the vehicle system 104. In step 2270, the vehicle system104 uses the technician public key 2420 from the service techniciancertificate 2400 to decrypt the challenge data, confirming theauthenticity of the technician by determining that the challenge datadecrypted by the secure physical token 2104 is identical to the originalchallenge data before encryption by the vehicle system 104. Uponauthenticating the technician, the vehicle system 104 may authorize thetechnician to perform a service operation on the vehicle, or to pass toa next required event or authorization.

Another novel type of authentication provided herein is technicianauthentication of a vehicle or component in the vehicle. This is similarto vehicle authentication of a service technician as described above inthat a secure device is similarly utilized. However, in this case theservice technician authenticates the vehicle or a component therein. Theservice technician accesses the prospective vehicle and obtains from acertification authority a certification that an authentic vehicle isassociated with a cryptographic key. The service technician utilizes thecryptographic key in cryptographic communication with the prospectivevehicle via a secure device having limited accessibility but beingaccessible by the service technician. The service technician determineswhether the prospective vehicle is the authentic vehicle based onwhether the cryptographic key is successfully utilized in thecryptographic communication. Other aspects of technician authenticationof a vehicle are similar to those described above with respect tocomponent authentication of a vehicle or, in the case of technicianauthentication of a component, similar to those described above withrespect to vehicle authentication of a component.

Authorization

Another novel aspect of configuration control as provided herein isauthorization. Providing the capability of authentication of aconfiguration element or service technician as described above makes itpossible to authorize a reconfiguration of the vehicle with respect tothat configuration element or service technician such as installation ormodification of a component or performance of a service operation by aservice technician.

One such type of authorization is vehicle authorization of a servicetechnician, which can be generally described as follows. Uponauthenticating a service technician as described above, the vehicleaccesses a technician database to determine whether the servicetechnician is indicated as authorized to perform the service operation.If the service technician is indicated as authorized to perform theservice operation, the vehicle allows the service technician to performthe service operation.

The service technician may be authorized merely based on whether theindividual is a member of an organization or class and/or consideredreliable. Additionally or alternatively, the service technician may beauthorized based on a type of the vehicle, a type of a componentinvolved in the service operation or a function performed in the serviceoperation. The service operation may involve installing the component inthe vehicle, removing the component from the vehicle, replacing thecomponent with another component, replacing another component with thecomponent, repairing the component, modifying the component, upgradingthe component and adding the component as an upgrade to anothercomponent.

The above process may be performed by the vehicle or by a component ofthe vehicle. The process may be performed by a computing unitauthenticating the service technician and accessing the techniciandatabase and allowing the service technician to perform the serviceoperation if the service technician is indicated by the techniciandatabase as authorized to perform the service operation. The computingunit may be a vehicle computing unit representing the vehicle or acomponent computing unit of a component of the vehicle.

Referring back to FIG. 21, a technician database 2108 is also providedwhich maintains a list of service technicians authorized to perform aservice operation on the vehicle 100. One of ordinary skill willrecognize that such a database can be implemented in a variety of ways,depending on the needs and circumstances at hand. For example, thetechnician database 2108 may maintain a list of service techniciansassociated with a set of functions each is authorized to perform withrespect to specified types of components for specified types ofvehicles. Such functions may include, for example, installing acomponent in the vehicle, removing a component in the vehicle, replacinga component in the vehicle, repairing a component in the vehicle,modifying a component in the vehicle, and upgrading a component in thevehicle.

Another novel type of authorization provided herein is authorization ofreconfiguration of a vehicle, which can be generally described asfollows. The vehicle authenticates a component for a reconfigurationfunction, such as described above in vehicle authentication of acomponent. The vehicle accesses a configuration database to determinewhether the reconfiguration function is authorized. Upon determiningthat the reconfiguration function is authorized, the vehicle allows thereconfiguration function to be performed. The reconfiguration functionmay be authorized based on a type of the vehicle, a type of thecomponent or a combination of configuration elements in a currentconfiguration of the vehicle.

The above process may be performed by a computing unit accessing theconfiguration database and allowing the reconfiguration function to beperformed upon determining that the reconfiguration function isauthorized. The reconfiguration function may involve installing thecomponent in the vehicle, removing the component from the vehicle,replacing the component with another component in the vehicle, replacinganother component in the vehicle with the component, modifying thecomponent, upgrading the component and rendering the component operable.

More specifically, in a potential embodiment of authorization ofreconfiguration of a vehicle, the vehicle system 104 of the vehicle 100first authenticates a component 400 by performing the process describedin FIG. 9. Upon authenticating the component 400, the vehicle system 104accesses the configuration database 208 to determine whether areconfiguration function, such as installation of the component 400 intothe vehicle 100, is authorized for the vehicle 100 having the specificconfiguration of configuration elements defined in the configurationdatabase 208.

The configuration database 208 stores information on all configurationelements of the vehicle configuration, thus representing the entireconfiguration of the vehicle at a given point in time. The configurationdatabase 208 further includes data indicating what components, serviceoperations, and so forth are authorized in the vehicle 100 having anexisting configuration as defined therein. The configuration database208 can be implemented a variety of ways, such as via conventionaldatabase structures, lists, rules, and so forth.

Configuration Management

Yet another novel aspect of configuration control as provided hereininvolves maintaining a configuration history of a vehicle. The vehiclemaintains a record of configuration elements of the configuration of thevehicle and maintains a history of configuration functions for each ofthe configuration elements. The history may include a record ofcorresponding times at which the configuration functions have occurred,which can be utilized to determine a configuration of the vehicle at atime of an event.

The history may also include a type of each configuration function. Theconfiguration functions may include, for example, the functions ofinstalling the configuration element in the vehicle, removing theconfiguration element from the vehicle, replacing the configurationelement with another configuration element in the vehicle, replacinganother configuration element in the vehicle with the configurationelement, modifying the configuration element, repairing theconfiguration element, upgrading the configuration element or renderingthe configuration element operable.

In another variation of the configuration history concept, the vehiclemaintains a record of configuration elements of the configuration of thevehicle and also maintains a service history of at least one servicetechnician performing a service operation with respect to acorresponding one of the configuration elements in the configuration.The service history may include maintaining a record of a correspondingtime at which the service technician performed the service operation,which may be utilized to determine a service technician having mostrecently performed a service operation at a time of an event.

The service history may also maintain a type of each service operation.The service operations may include, for example, installing aconfiguration element in the vehicle, removing the configuration elementfrom the vehicle, replacing the configuration element with anotherconfiguration element, replacing another configuration element with theconfiguration element, repairing the configuration element, modifyingthe configuration element, upgrading the configuration element or addingthe configuration element as an upgrade to another configurationelement.

More specifically, in a potential embodiment of this concept the vehiclesystem 104 maintains in the configuration database 206 a record ofconfiguration elements of a configuration of the vehicle 100. Theconfiguration database 206 further includes a history of configurationfunctions for each of the configuration elements along with a record ofcorresponding times at which the configuration functions have occurred.This record and/or history or aspects thereof may be maintained in a wayso as to provide nonrepudiation of the data therein. For example, thedata may be signed by an entity bearing some responsibility related tothe data with a digital signature of that entity so that the entitycannot later repudiate the data. By accessing the configuration database206, it can thus be determined what the configuration of the vehicle atthe time of an event, such as an accident, malfunction or othersignificant event. This can be useful in diagnosis for repair,determination of liability and so forth.

Additionally, the configuration database 206 maintains a service historyof service technicians that have performed a service operation withrespect to a configuration element in the configuration. Theconfiguration database 206 further maintains a record of a correspondingtime at which each of the service technicians performed a serviceoperation. This record and/or service history or aspects thereof may bemaintained in a way so as to provide nonrepudiation of the data therein.For example, the data may be signed by an entity bearing someresponsibility related to the data with a digital signature of thatentity so that the entity cannot later repudiate the data. By accessingthe configuration database 206, it can thus be determined what servicetechnician had most recently performed a service operation at a time ofan event such as an accident, malfunction or other significant event.This can also be useful in diagnosis for repair, determination ofliability and so forth.

The invention has been described with reference to one or moreillustrative embodiments. However, further modifications andimprovements may occur to those skilled in the art. The claims areintended to cover all such modifications and changes as fall withing thescope and spirit of the invention.

1. A method for authentication of a prospective vehicle by a servicetechnician for performing a service operation on the prospectivevehicle, the method performed by the service technician and a securedevice, and comprising the steps of: accessing the prospective vehicle;obtaining from a certification authority a digital signature, whereinthe digital signature certifies the prospective vehicle as an authenticvehicle and certifies an identified attribute of the authentic vehicle,and wherein the digital signature is associated with a certificate thatcomprises an attribute identifying the authentic vehicle and acryptographic key, wherein the cryptographic key is bound to theauthentic vehicle; utilizing the cryptographic key in cryptographiccommunication with the prospective vehicle via a secure device havinglimited accessibility but being accessible by the service technician;and determining whether the prospective vehicle is the authentic vehiclebased on whether the cryptographic key is successfully utilized in thecryptographic communication.
 2. The method of claim 1 wherein identifiedattribute is a vehicle identification number.
 3. The method of claim 1wherein the identified attribute is a vehicle manufacturer.
 4. Themethod of claim 1 wherein the cryptographic key is a publiccryptographic key of the authentic vehicle and the prospective vehiclehas a corresponding private key previously stored therein and onlyaccessible thereby.
 5. The method of claim 1, trther comprising the stepof determining that the certification authority is authorized to certifythe authentic vehicle.
 6. The method of claim 4 wherein the determiningstep includes issuing a cryptographic challenge to the vehicle, whereinthe vehicle encrypts the challenge using the vehicle private key andpasses the encrypted challenge to the secure device, wherein the securedevice decrypts the encrypted challenge using the public key from thecertificate to authenticate that the decrypted challenge is the same asthe original challenge.
 7. The method of claim 6 wherein the challengeis a randomly generated number.
 8. The method of claim 1 whereincertification authority is the vehicle manufacturer.
 9. The method ofclaim 1 wherein the secure device has certification and includes theprivate key of the authentic vehicle, and the prospective vehicle hasthe same private key previously stored therein and only accessiblethereby.
 10. A method for authentication of a prospective vehicle by aservice technician for performing a service operation on the prospectivevehicle, the method performed by the service technician and a securedevice, and comprising the steps of: accessing the prospective vehicle;obtaining for the secure device a digital signature, wherein the digitalsignature certifies the prospective vehicle as an authentic vehicle andcertifies an identified attribute of the authentic vehicle, and whereinthe digital signature is associated with a certificate that comprises anattribute identifying the authentic vehicle and a secret cryptographickey stared therein; challenging the prospective vehicle utilizing thesecret cryptographic key in cryptographic communication via the securedevice; encrypting the challenge by the prospective vehicle using aprivate key stored therein; decrypting the challenge using the secretkey of the secure device; and determining whether the prospectivevehicle is the authentic vehicle based on whether the decryptedchallenge in the cryptographic communication is the same as the originalchallenge.
 11. A method for authentication of a prospective component ofa vehicle by a service technician for performing a service operation onthe vehicle with respect to the prospective component, the methodperformed by the service technician and a secure device, and comprisingthe steps of: accessing the prospective component of the vehicle;obtaining from a certification authority a digital signature, whereinthe digital signature certifies an identified attribute of an authenticcomponent and wherein the digital signature is associated with acertificate that comprises an attribute identifying the authenticcomponent and a cryptographic key, wherein the cryptographic key isbound to the attribute identifying the authentic component; utilizingthe cryptographic key in cryptographic communication with theprospective component via a secure device having limited accessibilitybut being accessible by the service technician; and determining whetherthe prospective component is the authentic component based on whetherthe cryptographic key is successfully utilized in the cryptographiccommunication.
 12. The method of claim 11 wherein identified attributeis a component serial number.
 13. The method of claim 11 wherein theidentified attribute is a component supplier.
 14. The method of claim 11wherein the cryptographic key is a public cryptographic key of theauthentic component and the prospective component has a correspondingprivate key previously stored therein and only accessible thereby. 15.The method of claim 11, further comprising the step of determining thatthe certification authority is authorized to certify the authenticcomponent.
 16. The method of claim 14 wherein the determining step ofincludes issuing a cryptographic challenge to the vehicle, wherein thevehicle encrypts the challenge using the vehicle private key and passesthe encrypted challenge to the secure device, wherein the secure devicedecrypts the encrypted challenge using the public key from thecertificate to authenticate that the decrypted challenge is the same asthe original challenge.
 17. The method of claim 16 wherein the challengeis a randomly generated number.
 18. The method of claim 11 wherein thecertification authority is the authentic component supplier.
 19. Themethod of claim 11 wherein the secure device has certification andincludes the private key of the authentic component, and the prospectivecomponent has the same private key previously stored therein and onlyaccessible thereby.
 20. The method of claim 11, further comprising thestep of performing the service operation upon determining dieprospective vehicle is the authentic component wherein the secure devicehas certification and includes the private key of the authenticcomponent, and the prospective component has the same private keypreviously stored therein and only accessible thereby, and wherein thedetermining step includes issuing a cryptographic challenge to thecomponent, wherein the component encrypts the challenge using thecomponent private key and passes the encrypted challenge to the securedevice, wherein the secure device decrypts the encrypted challenge usingits private key to authenticate that the decrypted challenge is the sameas the original challenge.